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Abstract— The Cognitive Radio approach can be considered
as a promising and suitable solution to solve in an efficient and
flexible way the increasing and continuous demand of services
and radio resources. This paper investigates how the adoption
of a cognitive radio strategy can help in the coexistence problem
of two wireless networks operating on the same spectrum of fre-
quencies. A DVB-SH based satellite network will be considered
as primary system, while an infrastructured wireless terrestrial
network will constitute the cognitive radio based secondary
system. In this work it will be presented a power resource
allocation technique based on Game Theory, considering mainly
Potential Games. We will show the proposed approach is
suitable for distributed implementation, furthermore it provides
performances comparable to an heuristic allocation method
representing the optimum allocation. The comparison between
these two resource allocation methods will be provided as result
of this work.
I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the increasing and continuous demand of
services and radio resources, the traditional communication
systems which imply an a priori association of the frequency
band, the service assigned to it and the used technology,
need to become much more flexible, efficient and easy-to-use
dynamic systems able to cope with the requirements and con-
straints of the environment and the users. A Cognitive Radio
(CR) approach can be considered as a promising and suitable
solution to solve this problem. The term cognitive radio was
introduced in [1] with reference to a communication system
able to observe and learn from the surrounding environment
as well as to implement and adapt its own transmission
modalities also to user requirements. The concept of CR is
originated from the contrast between an increasing demand
of broadband services and the scarcity of radio resources.
Recent studies of the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force
[2] demonstrated that a large amount of licensed bands are
under-utilized, i.e., a lot of spectral resources are reserved for
specific services, but, actually, they remain unused for most
of the time or in several locations. From these studies, the
possibility of a CR is envisaged, i.e., a system able to sense
the electromagnetic environment (spectrum sensing), detect
the spectral resources actually occupied in a given temporal
interval and in a given location, and use the free bands
(spectrum holes) for its own communications [3]. The search
for available resources is not limited to spectrum portions
dedicated to unlicensed communications, but is also extended
to licensed bands. This paper shows the potential benefits of
the adoption of a cognitive radio strategy to the coexistence
problem. The developed cognitive radio strategy it has been
formulated according the mathematical discipline of Game
Theory, with particular reference to Potential Games [4].
Game Theory has already been considered in radio re-
source management of wireless networks as well as in the
development of access control and routing techniques. In
[5], an extensive study about the adoption of Game Theory
based methods in wireless networks has been done. Potential
Games applications in CDMA power control problems have
been investigated in [6] and [7], while in [8] this mathe-
matical framework has been used to model an interference
avoidance scheme. However it is in Cognitive Radio net-
works analysis that Potential Games are being used widely,
as firstly noticed in [9]. The PhD thesis [10] investigates
various applications in Cognitive Radio contexts; it proposes
as well a distributed frequency selection algorithm developed
through Potential Games. In [11], a spectrum sharing game is
formulated in order to perform a distributed adaptive channel
allocation in a CR network, while in [12] the potential game
framework encompasses both power control and channel
selection.
In this paper a Game Theory based strategy is employed
to perform power allocation in an OFDM Cognitive Radio
network. Such power allocation is aimed to the up-link com-
munication toward the CR local base station, in a scenario
similar to the one envisaged by IEEE 802.22 Draft Standard
for WRANs [13]. The main contribution of this work is to
achieve the solution of the Potential Game in closed form for
the case of a two-carriers OFDM system, and then, to extend
such solution to the considered OFDM system. It will be
also showed in Section III-A, how the considered potential
function is readily available for distributed implementation.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section II the
coexistence scenario will be described while Section III will
explain the Game Theory based framework. In the Section IV
the achieved results and the comparisons with the heuristic
allocation method will be presented. The concluding remarks
will be given in Section V.
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Fig. 1. The considered scenario
II. THE COEXISTENCE SCENARIO
The considered scenario is constituted by a primary li-
censed system and a secondary system whose terminals
implement cognitive resource allocations, i.e. the Cognitive
Radio based network. In particular it has been considered
a mobile satellite system compatible with DVB-SH stan-
dard [14] as primary system in the envisaged scenario. As
secondary system, it has been considered an infrastructured
wireless terrestrial network, i.e. all the secondary terminals
communicate with a local base station. The two systems
work in the L band frequency spectrum (0,39-1,55 GHz),
which in this context is considered as the main radio re-
source. In Fig.1 it is showed the proposed scenario. For
both systems it has been supposed, as representation in
the frequency domain of the transmitted OFDM symbols,
a complex vector of length K, which is the actual number
of subcarriers used to transmit the signal. Considering the
DVB-SH standard specifics, K has been set equal to 853.
The two communication systems require the definition of
two distinct channel models. For the satellite based primary
system at L band it has been considered the Lutz et al.
propagation model [15]. This model is based on a two
state, GOOD-BAD, Markov chain for the fading process.
Both slow fading and fast fading are kept into account.
In particular, slow fading events due to large obstacles are
modeled as a finite state machine; fast fading events instead,
caused by irregular obstacles (e.g. vegetative shadowing) and
multipath phenomena, they have been superimposed as a
random variation with a specific probability density function
for each state of Markov chain. The propagation model
described shows a flat frequency response. A path loss term
has been also considered in the primary system propagation
model. The path loss is modeled by:
L = 10 log10
(
4pid
λ0
)α
dB (1)
where α is the attenuation depending on the distance, λ0
is the wave-length at central frequency of the considered
frequency band, and d is the distance between the transmitter
and the receiver.
The propagation channel model considered for the ter-
restrial secondary system keeps into account mainly two
phenomena: the path loss and the multipath fading. The
path loss term is given by the expression used into the
channel model for the primary system, i.e. the equation
(1). The multipath fading due to the operating environment
has been considered through a tapped-delay model with
Rayleigh distributed coefficients. The power delay profile is
exponential as follows:
σ2n = e
−βn (2)
where σ2n is the variance of the n-th coefficient and β is
computed for a normalized mean power response. In the
time domain the propagation model adopted exibits a finite
impulse response of l samples resulting in a frequency
selective channel response.
III. THE POWER ALLOCATION GAME
The Game Theory based allocation approach in the sec-
ondary network implies the definition of a proper framework.
Indeed Game Theory, if formulated in the correct way, can
lead to a stable equilibrium point known as Nash Equilibrium
of the game. Such framework needs the definition of the
players involved in the game that in this case are M cognitive
radio terminals. Furthermore a set of available strategies has
to be defined. The strategies are the actions each player
can choose from in order to adapt both to the operating
environment and to the opponent players choices. It has
been considered as possible strategies for the players, the
amounts of power that secondary terminals allocate on the
K OFDM subcarriers to communicate effectively with the
secondary system base station. The strategies actually played
can be represented through a power allocation matrix, PII,
containing all the amounts of power the cognitive terminals
allocate. The power allocation matrix has some mandatory
constraints to respect. In fact each cognitive radio terminal
has to keep into account two constraints per subcarrier plus
a general one due to the maximum power available on board
for transmission, P IImax. The constraint on the maximum
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power for the i-th user can be stated in the following way:
K∑
k=1
p IIi (k) 6 P IImax (3)
where the term p IIi (k) stands for the amount of power the
i-th cognitive user is allocating on the k-th subcarrier. As far
as it is concerned about the constraints on each subcarrier,
two constraints are needed: one establishing the minimum
amount of power to allocate in order to respect the secondary
system target BER (i.e. the lower bound), the second one
is needed in order to guarantee and protect the primary
system functioning and it establishes the maximum amount
of power on a certain subcarrier (i.e. the upper bound).
The lower bound relative to the k-th subcarrier for the i-
th terminal is given by equation (4) at the top of the next
page, where SINR IImin is the signal-to-noise-interference
ratio corresponding to the maximum BER tolerable by a
cognitive terminal in order to use a QPSK modulation, hIIi (k)
is the channel coefficient between the i-th terminal and the
base station of the secondary network relative to the k-th
subcarrier,
∑M
j=1,j 6=i h
II
j (k)p
II
j (k) is the interference on the
k-th subcarrier due to the other terminals of the secondary
network, c I→II(k)P I(k) is the disturb due to the transmission
of the satellite system on the k-th subcarrier, and N(k) is the
noise power on the k-th subcarrier. The former constraints
define a multidimensional real subspace within the available
strategies stay. Given such particular constraints the real
subspace considered is compact and convex.
The upper bound relative to the k-th subcarrier for the i-
th terminal is given by equation (5), where SINR Imin is
the signal-to-noise-interference ratio corresponding to the
maximum BER tolerable by receivers of the primary system,
h I(k) is the coefficient describing the channel between
the satellite and the primary terminal nearest to the i-th
secondary user, P I(k) is the power the primary system
satellite is transmitting on the k-th subcarrier, c II→Ii (k) is the
channel coefficient considering the impairment effects of the
power allocation p IIi (k) on the primary receiver nearest to the
i-th terminal. In the case inequalities (4) and (5) don’t have
a common interval of real values, it is clear no power will
be allocated on that subcarrier. This possibility identifies a
situation where a primary system receiver is particularly near
to a cognitive terminal or it is particularly sensible on some
subcarriers to impairments effects due to cognitive terminals.
Finally opportune utility functions have to be defined.
They represent the future benefit a player will achieve
adopting a certain strategy, i.e. power allocation. In this case,
the utility functions map the power allocation strategies for
the i-th player into a real number considering also the power
allocated by other terminals, i.e. ui : P II → R. Making
the assumption of rationality for all implies each player will
choose the strategy producing the highest utility. Thus, it
is a coherent hypothesis since the players are electronic
devices suitably programmed. The choice of utility functions
with specific properties has a crucial importance in the
development of the game and especially in the existence
of Nash Equilibrium Point. The utility function for the i-th
cognitive player has been defined in the following way:
ui(P II) =
K∑
k=1
B log2
[
1 + SINRi
(
P II(k)
) ]
−
M∑
m=1
c II→Im (k)p
II
m(k) (6)
where SINRi
(
PII(k)
)
represents the signal-to-noise-
interference ratio the i-th terminal is achieving on the k-
th subcarrier at the base station of the secondary network.
SINRi
(
PII(k)
)
is so defined:
SINRi
(
P II(k)
)
=
=
h IIi (k)p
II
i (k)∑M
j=1,
j 6=i
h IIj (k)p
II
j (k) + c I→II(k)P I(k) +N(k)
(7)
In the previous equations PII is the power allocation matrix
concerning all the secondary terminals. PII has dimension-
ality KxM , where K is the number of subcarriers and M is
the number of secondary terminals. Moreover in equation (6)
the term B is the channelization bandwidth value considered
for every subcarrier. The sum of the terms c I→II(k)P I(k) and
N(k) in (7) has been assumed the same for all the secondary
users; the reason is due to the mathematical conditions
required to develop analitically the game. The chosen utility
functions have as domain the real subspace given by the
power constraints introduced before. It has to be pointed out
the utility functions chosen have an attractive property: they
are twice differentiable. Concerning the meaning of (6), the
first part is the sum of capacity values achieved by i-th player
with the power allocation vector p IIi : higher this sum will
be, higher the bit rate achieved by a terminal in the uplink
will be. The sum
∑M
m=1 c
II→I
m (k)p
II
m(k), in the second part
of (6), considers instead the disturbs caused on the primary
users and it counterbalances the secondary terminal tendency
to use as much power as possible.
The defined game will be since now referred synthetically
as Γ = (M,P, {ui}). In order to determine the solution
point of the game Γ, i.e. the Nash Equilibrium, the utility
functions have been modified to highlight the considered
game is a Potential Game. According [4], a game, that
respects the definition of Potential Game, has a potential
function encompassing the gains all the players perceive
changing their own strategy. The only technical requirement
to assure the convergence of the game is that at each
stage at most one player can change its strategy. The last
condition is mandatory in order to achieve a best response
strategy increasing at each stage the value of the potential
function. In the considered scenario the requirement can
be fullfilled, imposing to terminals to allocate power in a
round robin way for example. For potential games it has
been also demonstrated that the Nash Equilibrium point is
corresponding to the strategies maximizing such potential
function. Potential games have been analyzed for applica-
tions in wireless networks by MacKenzie and DaSilva in
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p IIi (k) >
SINR IImin
(∑M
j=1,
j 6=i
h IIj (k)p
II
j (k) + c
I→II(k)P I(k) +N(k)
)
h IIi (k)
(4)
p IIi (k) 6
h I(k)P I(k)
SINR Iminc
II→I
i (k)
−
∑M
j=1,
j 6=i
c II→Ij (k)p
II
j (k)
c II→Ii (k)
− N(k)
c II→Ii (k)
(5)
[16]. Afterwards some interesting results in [16] will be
used to prove that Γ is a potential game and to identify the
associated potential function.
Through opportune manipulations over the utility func-
tions, it is possible to show the following condition is
satisfied for all i and j:
∂2ui
∂p IIi ∂p
II
j
=
∂2uj
∂p IIi ∂p
II
j
(8)
where pi and pj are the power allocation strategies on the
k subcarriers made by respectively the i-th and j-th users.
A property required to satisfy the former condition is the
twice differentiability of utility functions, but the chosen
set owns it as already stated. In [4] authors have presented
equation (8) as mandatory condition for a game to be an
Exact Potential Game. The considered game for cognitive
secondary terminals will be then managed as a potential
game. It has to be underlined equation (8) is verified because
of the former assumption about the sum of c I→II(k)P I(k)
and N(k).
The potential function V : P II → R for the game Γ has
to be, for all players and strategies, such that:
V (p IIi ,p
II
−i)− V (p′ IIi ,p II−i) = ui(p IIi ,p II−i)− ui(p′ IIi ,p II−i)
(9)
where p IIi and p
′ II
i are two different power allocation vectors
for the i-th user, while p II−i is the power allocation matrix
for all the opponents of the i-th user in the game. Exploiting
a result reported in [16] about the definition of potential
function for exact potential games, it has been determined
the potential function V (P II) for the proposed game. This
function is given by:
V (P II) =
K∑
k=1
B log2
[
N(k) + c I→II(k)P I(k) +
+
M∑
m=1
h IIm(k)p
II
m(k)
]
−
M∑
m=1
c II→Im (k)p
II
m(k) (10)
A. The solution of the game
The definition of the potential function implies that the
solution of Γ can be found maximizing V (P II). Such power
allocation matrix, representing a profile of strategies use by
players, will lead to the Nash Equilibrium. It has to be
pointed out that we aren’t dealing anymore with a game
in the classic mathematical sense, in fact the definition of
a potential function allows to treat Γ as an optimization
problem with several constraints given by equations (3), (4)
and (5). Furthermore this optimization problem is a convex
problem since the potential function V (P II) is convex and
the real subspace defined by constraints is convex as well.
Recalling the assumption that only one player can change its
power strategy at a certain time, we have that the value of
potential function will increase step by step till the maximum
value will be reached. This means the maximization of (10) is
carried out by each cognitive terminal optimizing a potential
function where the terms depending on the other players
are considered constant. Then the potential function each
cognitive terminal will maximize will be:
V (p IIi ) =
K∑
k=1
B log2
[
αi(k) + h IIi (k)p
II
i (k)
]−
−c II→Ii (k)p IIi (k)− βi(k) (11)
where αi(k) and βi(k) are costant terms, for the k-th
subcarrier, of the function relative to the i-th user. The terms
αi(k) and βi(k) are actually the following quantities:
αi(k) = N(k) + c I→II(k)P I(k) +
+
M∑
m=1,
m6=i
h IIm(k)p
II
m(k) (12)
βi(k) =
M∑
m=1,
m6=i
c II→Im (k)p
II
m(k) (13)
In order to show a fully distributed resource allocation
technique has been achieved, equations (12) and (13) need an
explanation. In (12) there are three terms at second member
of the equation, the first two terms, N(k) and c I→II(k)P I(k),
give a constant sum as formerly assumed for mathematical
necessities. The third term
∑M
m=1,m6=i h
II
m(k)p
II
m(k) is actu-
ally the interference the signal from the i-th user is perceiving
at the base station. In order to achieve a fully distributed
technique, the value of this sum can be communicated
each time by the base station to the terminal performing
the allocation during the downlink. Differently the term∑M
m=1,m6=i c
II→I
m (k)p
II
m(k) in (13) encompasses the channel
state coefficients, c II→Im , between secondary terminals and
their relative nearest primary receiver. It is reasonable to as-
sume that each secondary terminal achieve the channel state
information regarding its nearest primary devices through
specific sensing and monitoring activities. Then it can be
assumed the estimation done is communicated to secondary
system base station as information in the packet overhead.
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The solution vector for the i-th terminal, p IIi , can be found
or with iterative methods, like gradient based methods, or
even in closed form through Lagrange multipliers mehod,
[17], when the value of K is low. In fact the complexity of
the problem is asymptotic with 2 · 3K . Since the number of
carriers K constitutes an issue for the optimization, we have
found the closed form solution when K = 2 and we have
extended to higher number of subcarriers, K  2, through
a Divide and Conquer based algorithm.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The whole system has been simulated in MatLabr envi-
ronment. Three different working points, in terms of Eb/No,
have been considered for the primary system receivers, i.e.
10 dB, 15 dB, 20 dB. The working points represent three
alternatives for the primary system operations. The primary
receivers achieved rate depends only on the Eb/No, since the
secondary system allocation strategy has always to preserve
the primary system users. As far as secondary system is
concerned, different BER target values have been considered
in the range (5 · 10−5 ÷ 10−2) for the secondary system
terminals.
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Fig. 2. The terminals placement.
The scenario considered for the simulations is the one
represented in Fig.2: two primary system terminals and
four cognitive radio terminals located around the secondary
system base station at the centre of scenario. The power
allocation has been performed over the 853 subcarriers men-
tioned in Section II. Fig.3 shows the actual BER achieved
by cognitive terminals. All the curves are widely below the
imposed target BER. The target BER required in advance has
been satisfied with a relevant margin. In Fig.4 the aggregate
rate of the cognitive radio network has been plotted as
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Fig. 3. The Bit Error Rate actually achieved at the base station by secondary
terminals as function of the average rate.
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Fig. 4. The aggregate rate of the secondary system as function of the
imposed target BER.
function of the target BER a-priori imposed. In the graph
two aggregate rates have been compared: a first one achieved
using the QPSK as originally assumed, and a second one
achieved employing the multilevel QAM modulation with
2, 4 or 6 bits transmitted per symbol according the signal-
to-noise ratio obtained at the base station. Multilevel QAM
demonstrates to be more efficient than the simple QPSK, and
then it will be considered later on for the comparisons with
an heuristic allocation algorithm. In Fig. 4 is also evident a
second aspect, the graph in fact shows how the aggregate
rate rises up relaxing the requirement for the secondary
system target BER. This trend is valid also for each cognitive
radio. The two graphs in Fig.5 show the signal-to-noise-
and-interference ratio of receivers no.1 and no.4 over the
considered frequency band. Cognitive terminals no.2 and
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Fig. 5. Signal-to-noise-interference ratio versus frequency for the secondary
terminals no.1 and no.4
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Fig. 6. The comparison between game theoretic approach and heuristic
approach in terms of aggregate rate.
no.3 have not been considered in this representation due
to the scarce resources they were achieving. This fact has
to be remarked since both receivers no.1 and no.4 have
primary terminal no.1 as nearest primary receiver. It can
be explained assuming that in this representation the pri-
mary no.1 leaves unoccupied wide portions of the spectrum
due to a channel particularly impaired. Finally Figs.6-8
display the comparisons in terms of terminal rate, Figs.7-
8, and aggregate rate, Fig.6, between the game theoretic
approach presented in this paper and an heuristic power
allocation method. The heuristic approach considered, it is
an extension to a multi-user context of the power allocation
strategy proposed in [18]. Differently from the analyzed
game theory approach, the heuristic method has a centralized
implementation and it needs a huge quantity of information
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Fig. 7. The comparison between game theoretic approach and heuristic
approach in terms of rate for terminals no.1 and no.2 .
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Fig. 8. The comparison between game theoretic approach and heuristic
approach in terms of rate for terminals no.3 and no.4 .
to be forwarded on the network. Fig.6 clearly shows what
is the difference of performance between the two methods:
the heuristic allocation outperforms the Game Theory based
allocation by a consistent amount, e.g. it doubles game theory
approach aggregate rate. This fact has not to be interpreted as
a failure for the Game Theory allocation because the heuristic
method is actually representing the optimal allocation, i.e. the
one achieving the highest rate. The detail of the comparison
for each terminal is given in Figs.7-8, where it is possible
to notice how the difference of rate between the methods
increases severely when the rate achieved is above 1 Mbps,
i.e. receivers no.3 and no.4; receiver no.1 manifests a similar
behaviour, while receiver no.2 shows an unusual occurrence
achieving higher rate through game theory approach than
through heuristic method. This result is going against the
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general tendency, and it lets assume that game theory strat-
egy is more fair than heuristic method toward those users
experiencing lower rates.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper it has been presented a power allocation
strategy for Cognitive Radio networks. The framework of
the proposed technique is based on Game Theory. It has
been showed how the game concerning power allocation is
a Potential Game. The potential function has been found and
it has been discussed how it can be implemented in a dis-
tributed way. Results achieved with the proposed technique
have been presented for a specific scenario. Performances
of the game theoretic approach have been given in terms of
rate, actual BER and signal-to-noise ratio. Finally the method
has been compared with the results achieved by an heuristic
approach to the power allocation, representing the optimum.
In the comparison the heuristic method outperformed game
theory based one; however this result has not to be interpreted
as a failure for the Game Theory allocation since, respect
to heuristic method, it can be implemented in a distributed
way. A final issue emerged, and it lets assume the proposed
method is intrinsically more oriented to fairness than the
heuristic one.
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